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"Mastering" Intervention in Prisons*
Since 1970, a series of federal cases have held that general conditions
of confinement in prisons' can violate inmates' Eighth Amendment
rights. 2 The courts have been confronted with situations in which in-
mates live in filthy, overcrowded conditions, receive inadequate atten-
tion for basic needs, and face continual threats of violence.3 These
cases pose a serious challenge to judicial capacity to grant relief.
To compensate for the courts' limitations, judges have begun ex-
perimenting with the use of special masters with diverse roles to aid in
implementing decrees in suits challenging conditions of confinement.4
0 The research for this Note was funded by a grant from the Guggenheim Criminal
Justice Foundation.
1. The term "prison" in this Note refers collectively to jails, prisons, reformatories, and
pretrial detention centers.
2. The first such case was Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), afO'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). The court called the case "the first time that convicts have at-
tacked an entire penitentiary system." Id. at 365; see 20 DaKE L. REv. 188 (1971); 84
HARV. L. REv. 456 (1970) (both noting significance of Holt). Since Holt, other courts have
used the totality of prison conditions as the basis for establishing Eighth Amendment
violations and awarding broad relief. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956
(D.R.I. 1977); Collins v. Schoonfeld, 344 F. Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972); Jones v. Wittenberg,
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1972).
Before the 1960s courts refused to consider the merits of prisoner petitions concerning
conditions of confinement; judges developed the "hands off" doctrine to justify non-
intervention. See, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954) (discretionary acts
of administrators nonreviewable). See generally Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506
(1963). During the 1960s courts abandoned the "hands off" doctrine and held that inmates
retain their constitutional rights except those curtailed for legitimate purposes. See, e.g.,
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (right to practice religious beliefs);
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (right to minimal procedural
safeguards in disciplinary hearings). At first, courts addressed the constitutionality of
particular practices of prison officials. See, e.g., Castor v. Mitchell, 355 F. Supp. 123
(W.D.N.C. 1973) (practice of awakening prisoners every 30 minutes enjoined). Eventually
courts accepted the doctrine that general conditions of confinement could constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. See generally Comment, Cruel But Not So Unusual Punish-
ment: The Role of the Federal Judiciary in State Prison Reform, 7 Cum. L. REv. 31, 32-37
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Cruel But Not So Unusual Punishment].
3. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D.R.I. 1977) (prisoner "sen-
tenced to a regime in which he will be forced to live in a state of constant fear of violence,
in imminent danger to his bodily integrity and physical and psychological well-being, and
without opportunity to seek a more promising future"). See generally Cruel But Not So
Unusual Punishment, supra note 2.
4. See, e.g., Jordan v. Wolke, 75 F.R.D. 696 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443
F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977). This Note will focus on the use of masters as opposed to other
non-Article III officials. To the extent that other non-Article III officials perform a role
similar to that of masters, the analysis suggested here may be applicable. For a description
of the role of other non-Article III officials in institutional reform litigation, see Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1300-01 (1976);
Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional
Change, 84 YALE L.J. 1338, 1343-47 (1975).
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This Note describes and analyzes the role of masters in prison litiga-
tion, based on field research conducted in five systems in which mas-
ters were appointed. 5 This research reveals that the role of the master
is limited because judicial intervention is not well suited to the task of
restructuring the patterns of decisionmaking and behavior that have
created prison conditions. Even within the limits of judicial involve-
ment, the legitimacy and effectiveness of the master may be com-
promised due to the conflicts among his multiple roles.6 Recognizing
that masters are bound to have limited success in remedying uncon-
stitutional prison conditions, the Note suggests a variety of useful
remedial techniques, ranging from cooperative forms of dispute resolu-
tion to coercive imposition of sanctions, and recommends ways to
clarify and strengthen the master's role.
I. Prison Conditions and the Role of the Master
A master appointed to aid in the implementation of a prison decree
becomes involved in the complex relationships among inmates, staff,
and administrators. Because these relationships are responsible for
many of the problems precipitating judicial intervention, the master's
role is both affected by and directed toward the patterns of interaction
in the prison.
A. Need for Intervention in Prisons
Prison conditions necessarily impose hardship on inmates who are
deprived of liberty, autonomy, sexual relationships, and material com-
forts, and are forced to live in proximity with potentially dangerous
inmates.7 Although critics have argued that these conditions are suf-
5. To understand the roles masters perform and the perceptions of the various
participants in decree implementation, the author conducted unstructured interviews with
judges, masters, plaintiffs' attorneys, defendants' attorneys, directors of departments of
corrections, sheriffs, wardens, supervisors, counselors, guards, and inmates in five prison
systems in which masters were appointed. Interviewees were asked to trace their involve-
ment with the court and the master, to discuss the relationships between various partici-
pants in each litigation, and to describe changes in relationships, policies, and prison con-
ditions. Information obtained through interviews was supplemented with memoranda,
correspondence, briefs, and newspaper articles concerning each litigation. To preserve con-
fidentiality when possible, the participants are referred to by letter, e.g., Master A;
Director B. Similarly, correspondence are referred to by letter and date, e.g., "Letter from
Master A to Defendants' Attorney A (July 5, 1973)." The transcripts of tape-recorded
interviews, notes of unrecorded interviews, and all supplementary material are on file with
the Yale Law Journal. The author served as assistant to the special master appointed in
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977).
6. As used in this Note, the pronoun "he" refers to both genders.
7. See C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JusIca 382-87 (1978); Grosser, Ex-
ternal Setting and Internal Relations of the Prison, in TmoRETIcAL STUDIES IN SOCIAL
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ficiently cruel to warrant the abolition of prisons,8 courts have gen-
erally refused to declare conditions that are viewed as endemic to pris-
ons unconstitutional. 9 In many prisons, however, inmates also are
subjected to the constant threat of physical violence, emotional degra-
dation, and arbitrary decisionmaking' 0
Most prisons employ a paramilitary approach to administration in
which guards and inmates are expected to follow orders without under-
standing, questioning, or participating in decisionmaking that affects
their living and working conditions." Regulations govern every aspect
of inmate behavior in order to control movement within the prison.'2
ORGANIZATION OF THE PRISON 133 (Soc. Sci. Research Council ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited
as THEORETICAL STUDIES]. Prison conditions also impose hardship on guards. The combina-
tion of working in dirty, violent conditions and maintaining other human beings in a
state of deprivation imposes a heavy psychological burden on them. See D. FOGEL, "...
WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF . . .": THE JUSTICE MODEL OF CORRECTIONS 72-82 (1975); J.
JACOBS, STATEViLLE 21 (1977). Although guards have no constitutional basis for challenging
prison conditions, they have sought to improve working conditions through unionization.
See J. JACOBS & N. CROTrY, GUARD UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS (1978).
8. See, e.g., Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 548-49 (W.D. Wis. 1972) ("[T]he
institution of prison probably must end. In many respects it is as intolerable ... as was
the institution of slavery, equally brutalizing to all involved, equally toxic to the social
system, equally subversive of the brotherhood of man, even more costly by some standards,
and probably less rational."); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 71-73, 202-04
(Viking ed. 1969).
9. See Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 506 (10th Cir. 1969) (courts will not review
deprivations that are necessary concomitants of imprisonment); Spain v. Procunier, 408 F.
Supp. 534, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (court must balance institutional needs against applicable
constitutional provisions).
10. See L. ORLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF DARKNESS 69 (1975) (quoting inmate) (" 'The
main beef of the prisoners is not the lack of rules governing the prisoners, but . . . the
stupidly capricious and arbitrary misapplication of the rules by the guard force and the
disciplinary boards.'" (ellipsis in original)); C. SILBERMAN, supra note 7, at 417 ("prison
officials' ability or inability to maintaii order affects inmates' well-being more directly,
and far more profoundly, than does any other aspect of prison life").
11. See McCleery, Communication Patterns as Bases of Systems of Authority and
Power, in THEORETICAL STUDIES, supra note 7, at 54-56 (inmates); Shrag, Some Founda-
tions for a Theory of Correction, in THE PRISON 336-38 (D. Cressey ed. 1961) (guards).
This system can be traced to the concept of the penitentiary as a method of rehabilitation,
in which regimentation was intended to reform the convict. See D. ROTHMAN, THE DIs-
COVERY OF THE ASYLUM 82-83 (1971). Guards were often subject to some of the same
regulation as the inmates they guarded. See J. JACOBS, supra note 7, at 38-40. Although
the justification has been abandoned, the institutions and practices developed to imple-
ment it continue to influence the operation of many prisons. See D. ROTHMAN, supra, at
239-47; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 162-63 (1967) [hereinafter cited as THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME].
12. See BOARD OF CONTROL OF STATE INSTITUTIONS, RULE BOOK IOwA STATE PENITENTIARY
1-11 (1961), reprinted in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION 87-91 (N.
Johnston, L. Savitz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1962).
Therapeutic programs and personnel are often subordinated to the demands of custody.
There is often a division of labor between "treatment" and "custody" staff, so that guards
are largely excluded from noncustodial programs and counselors' authority over the main-
tenance of inmates is limited. See J. JACOBS, supra note 7, at 95-99; McCleery, supra note
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Guards, the officials immediately responsible for enforcing regula-
tions, often lack official sanctions and incentives to control inmates. 13
They cannot rely on force because of the high inmate/guard ratio, the
constraints imposed by law, and the possibility of creating a major
disturbance.14 Guards are often unable to enforce every regulation and
are unwilling to use formal disciplinary procedures because frequent
reports of inmate misbehavior may be interpreted as evidence of in-
effectiveness.' 5
The failures of the official system have contributed to the develop-
ment of informal means of coercion and control. In many prisons an
inmate hierarchy develops in which experienced inmates who are will-
ing to use force, bribes, and illegitimately obtained resources exercise
control over newcomers.' 6 Guards often rely on the inmate hierarchy
to maintain the appearance of order.17 They give powerful inmates in-
formation, goods, and immunity from enforcement of institutional
rules in exchange for the maintenance of a facade of order.'8
This informal system increases the sense of injustice felt by less
powerful inmates,' 9 aggravates antagonisms between guards and in-
mates, 20 and, ironically, encourages "the highest possible threat of
disruption and violence" 21-the very result that these informal rela-
11, at 54. The structures of communication and control can hinder the therapeutic effec-
tiveness of counselors. See Cressey, Limitations on Organization of Treatment in the
Modern Prison, in THEORETICAL SroDIES, supra note 7, at 86-87, 94-95.
13. See G. SYKES, THE SociEty OF CAirIvEs 50-52 (1958); Cloward, Social Control in the
Prison, in THEORETICAL SrTUOms, supra note 7, at 22-32.
14. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 7, at 392-94, 406-08; G. SYRKS, supra note 13, at 49-50.
15. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 7, at 398; Cloward, supra note 13, at 36.
16. See, e.g., McCleery, supra note 11, at 57 ("The absence of published regula-
tions .... the secrecy and the arbitrariness associated with the enforcement of discipline,
the shocking unfamiliarity of the prison situation, and the demands that regimentation
imposed, all combined to make the newly admitted inmate completely dependent on the
experienced prisoner."); McCorkle & Kom, Resocialization Within Walls, in THE SOCIOLOGY
OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION, suPra note 12, at 100-01.
17. See Note, Bargaining in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation be-
tween the Inmate and the Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726, 734-35 (1972).
18. McCleery, The Governmental Process and Informal Social Control, in THE PRISON,
supra note 11, at 162; Note, supra note 17, at 738-41.
19. See E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS 12-66 (1961) (impact of incarceration on inmates);
Grosser, supra note 7, at 133 (preincarceration perception of injustice).
20. Antagonisms exist between inmates and guards because guards are the closest visible
symbol of the authority restraining inmates. Guards must execute the most degrading
aspects of holding individuals in custody. See J. JAcos, supra note 7, at 67 (guards
required to "keep ear to plumbing" to "tap" inmate conversations); G. SYKRs, suPra note
13, at 22 ("the custodians' task of maintaining order with the prison is acerbated by the
conditions of life which it is their duty to impose on their captives"). Informal bargaining
contributes to this hostility because of the unpredictability and vulnerability of the in-
formal relationships. McCorkle & Korn, supra note 16, at 103; Shrag, supra note 11, at 345.
21. Note, supra note 17, at 744. Aggression and violence may be precipitated by power
struggles among competing inmate groups, by attempts to reestablish adherence to rules,
1065
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1062, 1979
tionships are intended to avoid. In addition, inmates have become more
conscious of their rights and have increasingly identified with partic-
ular ethnic or religious groups within the prison. Consequently, they
are less willing to participate in the informal system of bargaining and
are more outspoken about the inadequacy of prison conditions.2 2 In-
mates often have no internal means of expressing their dissatisfaction
or obtaining redress other than resorting to violence.2 3
To reduce the level of brutality and arbitrariness, therefore, it is nec-
essary to alter the relationship between guards and inmates, to provide
inmates with access to goods and privileges on an impartial basis, and
to provide a means of productively channelling inmate dissatisfaction
so that violence is not perceived as necessary.24 Prison administrators
are often limited in their capacity to restructure patterns of communi-
and by attempts of inmates or guards to sanction each other for failing to adhere to
bargains. See McCorkle & Korn, supra note 16, at 103; McCorkle, Guard-Inmate Relation-
ships in Prison, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION, supra note 12, at 110.
The power struggle among inmates and guards often divides along racial lines. See
Carroll, Race and Three Forms of Prisoner Power, in CONTEMPORARY CoRmErIoNs 43-47,
49-53 (C. Huff ed. 1977).
22. See J. JACOBS, supra note 7, at 58-67 (informal network of social control undermined
by Muslim challenge); Jacobs, Stratification and Conflict Among Prison Inmates, 66 J.
CIum. L.C. & P.S. 476, 481 (1975) (prison community "arena where competing groups seek
at each other's expense larger memberships and greater power"). In systems with weak
leadership and politicization of inmates, the tension between inmates, guards, and ad-
ministrators is heightened by the emergence of strong inmate factions. See Inmates, guards
in ACI protest, Providence J.-Bull., Apr. 13, 1978, at 3, col. 5 ("Two groups of prisoners
. . . staged protests yesterday because of alleged rough treatment meted out to an in-
mate ... , and an entire shift of guards staged a counter protest by refusing to work for
several hours."); ACI guards stop work to protest trash war, Providence Sunday J., Apr.
30, 1978, at 1, col. 7.
23. See J. KEATING, PRISON GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS 19-20 (1977) ("[Inmates] refuse to
eat or work, burn their mattresses, break their television sets, and endanger lives with
their protests. 'It may seem stupid,' explained one rioter, 'but this is the only time some-
one ever listened to us.' ")
24. See D. FOGEL, supra note 7, at 204-36 (justice model of corrections involves self-
governance, productive modes of conflict resolution, access to legal aid in prison, just
administration of rules, and ombudsman to oversee fairness of system); C. SILBERMAN,
supra note 7, at 417-23 (by orienting prison program to majority of inmates who want
to do their time peacefully and projecting the expectation that inmates will assume
responsibility for their actions, program achieved nonviolent environment in which in-
mates and staff work cooperatively). Arguments against more participatory modes of
administration usually focus on the possibility that official procedures will be used by
inmates to enhance their own power and harass staff. See D. FOGEL, supra note 7, at 210-
13; J. KEATING, supra note 23, at 29. Although there is the danger that such abuse will
occur, the likelihood can be reduced by encouraging and carefully defining staff involve-
ment, rotating inmates' tenure in any policymaking role, and carefully delineating the
areas of shared decisionmaking. D. FOGEL, supra note 7, at 214-15; J. KEATING, supra note
23, at 29. Furthermore, violence and abuse of power occur under the current system, so




cation and decisionmaking; they may be unaware of alternative methods
of operation2 5 or influenced by staff who are afraid of the consequences
of reform.26 Members of the prison community who benefit from the
current structure are likely to resist efforts to reduce their control.27
The larger political community provides prison officials with little
incentive to take the risks inherent in changing the current structure.28
Individual citizens rarely have a stake in prison conditions, so prison
officials often have no external constituency to demand accountability
or provide political support.2 9 Administrators are often evaluated by
their superiors in terms of their success in maintaining low-visibility
and low-cost prison conditions. 30 Because public officials are often
unwilling to allocate funds necessary to provide adequate resources, 31
existing problems are intensified by shortages of staff, space, and other
resources.
3 2
Intervention, therefore, is necessary to establish a new norm for
25. There has not been a significant level of exchange of ideas and techniques in the
field of corrections management and public administration. See Cohn, The Failure of
Correctional Management, in CoRREcTIONS: PROBLEMS OF PUNIsHMENT AND REHABILITATION
53-54 (E. Sagarin & D. MacNamara eds. 1972).
26. Those accustomed to an authoritarian regime are often suspicious of reforms in-
troducing therapeutic concerns and professional staff into the prison. See J. JAcoBs, supra
note 7, at 82; McCleery, supra note 11, at 69-71.
27. Career guards or wardens may perceive such changes as a threat to their autonomy
and security within the prison, and strongly resist efforts to alter established methods of
operation. See J. JACOBs, supra note 7, at 82, 85; McCleery, supra note 11, at 69-70. Elite
inmates are also likely to attempt to maintain guards' and administrators' dependency on
them. See Cloward, supra note 13, at 44-46.
28. To overcome resistance of old-line guards and powerful inmates, see note 27 supra,
administrators may have to challenge their power in the prison, thereby promoting short-
term disruptions such as guard walkouts or inmate boycotts, see, e.g., Prison protest
'Power test,' says Moran, Providence J.-Bull., Apr. 15, 1978, at I, col. 5 (Director of Depart-
ment of Corrections attributes protest of inmates following firing of several powerful in-
mates from prison jobs to ongoing power struggle between inmates and administration);
id. at 24, col. 1 (guards refuse to work for several hours). Such consequences may generate
negative publicity and jeopardize the administrator's political career. Cohn, supra note
25, at 51 (correctional administrator unwilling to take risks that may produce conflict
with those to whom he is accountable).
29. See Grosser, supra note 7, at 132.
30. See Ohlin, Conflicting Interests in Correctional Objectives, in THEORETICAL STUDIEs,
suPra note 7, at 122-29.
31. See, e.g., M. HARRIs, AFTER DEcIsION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN
CORRECTIONAL SETrINGs-A CASE STUDY OF Holland v. Donelon 38 (1976) (one "jail man-
ager" perceived shortage of funds to be major hindrance to implementation of court
orders although others did not agree); Comment, The Role of the Eighth Amendment in
Prison Reform, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 647, 648 (1971); Letter from Sheriff D to City Council
(Nov. 17, 1975) (sheriff informs city council that he cannot comply with court order due
to council's failure to appropriate requested funds).
32. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 11, at 162, 163.
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prison social structure and conditions, 33 to expose prison officials to
more effective methods of administration, 34 and to continue to apply
pressure so that these methods are developed. 35 The master appointed
to aid in the implementation of a prison decree often attempts to ful-
fill all of these functions. In addition to traditional monitoring and
enforcement duties, he performs a variety of roles intended to alter the
internal patterns of governance. The remainder of this Note draws on
field research to assess whether such efforts can succeed.
B. The Master as Intervenor in Prisons
Traditionally, courts have used masters36 in cases requiring special
expertise or imposing an extraordinary burden on the court.37 Masters
have performed specific fact-finding duties that consist of investig-ating,
33. See COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS, MANUAL OF STANDARDS FOR
ADULT CoRREcTIONAL INSTITUTIONS xii (1977) (need to establish professional standards for
corrections); NATIONAL ADvIsoRY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
CORRECTIONS 4-5, 356 (1973) (need to formulate standards and goals to develop support for
correctional reform).
34. See note 25 supra.
35. See Cressey, Sources of Resistance to Innovation in Corrections, in CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 447-56 (R. Carter, D. Glaser & L. Wilkins eds. 1972).
36. Courts first based their authority to appoint non-Article III officials to aid in
carrying out their judicial functions on the courts' inherent power. See Ex Parte Peterson,
253 U.S. 300 (1919).
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a statutory basis for the
appointment of a special master. The rule provides:
(a) ... [T]he [district] court in which any action is pending may appoint a special
master therein .... [Tjhe word "master" includes a referee, an auditor, an examiner,
a commissioner, and an assessor...
(b) ... A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule....
(c) ... The order of reference to the master may specify or limit his powers ....
Subject to the specifications and limitations stated in the order, the master has and
shall exercise the power to regulate all proceedings in every hearing before him and
to do all acts and take all measures necessary or proper for the efficient performance
of his duties under the order.
ie;(2) . . . [T]he court shall accept the master's findings of fact unless clearly
erroneous.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53. For a discussion of the traditional use of special masters, see Kaufman,
Masters in Federal Courts: Rule 53, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1958); Silberman, Masters and
Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1297 (1975).
37. Masters have been used to dispose of overly burdensome fact-finding processes
involved in determining procedural and jurisdictional issues during the pretrial stage of
litigation, see, e.g., In re Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 107 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1939); Stone
v. Southern Pac. Co., 32 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); to supervise discovery, see, e.g.,
First-Iowa Hydro Elec. Co-op. v. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 245 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871 (1957); to aid the court in making factual determinations and
computing damages in complex cases, see, e.g., Zegers v. Zegers, Inc., 458 F.2d 726 (7th
Cir. 1972); Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 308 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); and to
perform ministerial tasks that do not require judicial expertise, see Foster v. City of
Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), affd, 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
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holding hearings, and reporting to the court on the issues under
consideration. 38
In prison and other civil rights cases,39 masters often perform a
broader role. Masters' duties in prison cases concern primarily the
provision of relief, rather than the determination of liability.40 They
usually perform some combination of adjudicative and administrative
functions to facilitate the implementation of the court decree,41 in ad-
dition to their traditional fact-finding role.42
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes
judges to appoint masters, primarily addresses the traditional role of
the master as fact-finder during trial.43 It leaves the definition of the
master's powers and duties to the discretion of the district court judge. 44
38. See Kaufman, supra note 36, at 462-68.
39. Courts have used masters in school desegregation, voting rights, housing, and mental
hospital litigation. See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation,
91 HARV. L. REv. 428, 450-52 (1977); Comment, Equitable Remedies: An Analysis of
Judicial Utilization of Neoreceiverships to Implement Large-Scale Institutional Change,
1976 Wis. L. REv. 1161, 1162-63.
40. See Comment, supra note 39, at 1174-75. Courts have used masters in prison cases
to intensify and broaden the scope of court involvement after years of noncompliance,
see, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82, 85 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (master appointed after
contempt proceedings to check defendants' performance), and to facilitate the process of
compliance by mediating between and advising the parties, see, e.g., Palmigiano v.
Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 989 (D.R.I. 1977); Hamilton v. Schiro, No. 69-2443 (E.D. La.
Oct. 19, 1971).
41. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 989 (D.R.I. 1977) (master em-
powered to hold hearings, make informal investigations at prison at any time, conduct
confidential interviews with staff and inmates, recommend firing, hiring, or transfer of
staff); Taylor v. Perini, No. 69-275 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 1975), modified, 413 F. Supp. 189,
193 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (master granted unlimited access to staff, facilities, and records and
empowered to hold hearings, seek contempt orders, and supervise, coordinate, and approve
defendants' compliance efforts).
Judges have preferred to avoid direct administrative responsibilities by remaining in
the judicial posture of reviewing findings and recommendations and placing upon the
defendants the responsibility for compliance, rather than appointing a receiver to carry
out court orders. See, e.g., Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement:
An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and Federal Court Supervision of State Penal Administra-
tion Under the Eighth Amendment, 29 STAN. L. Rav. 893, 923 (1977). But cf. Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975), affd sub nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 540
F.2d 527 (Ist Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977) (receiver appointed in school
desegregation case).
42. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 986 (D.R.I. 1977) (court
designates master "as an arm and as the eyes and ears of the Court").
43. See note 36 supra.
44. Factors that may affect the nature and scope of the master's power include:
(1) The judge's view of the proper role of the court. One judge defined his role as
promoting constitutional conditions in the prison and stated that he "wasn't concerned
with the strict mechanics of how it was accomplished." Judge B at 18. The master ap-
pointed in that case was delegated broad supervisory powers. Another judge stated that
the role of the federal judge is not to resolve social conflict, but rather to resolve con-
stitutional issues that arise in the course of a particular case. Judge E at 1. The master
appointed in that case was required to allow counsel to accompany him on visits unless
1069
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 1062, 1979
The judge sets forth those powers and duties, usually in broad terms,45
in the "order of reference" appointing the master. Aside from the order
of reference, few legal standards or informal guidelines exist to help the
master determine how to perform his duties.46
In the absence of an explicit definition of his role, the master tends
to respond to demands imposed by the prison situation and the par-
ticipants in the suit.47 The master often finds that the decree imple-
mentation process is impeded by the parties' disagreement over what
specific changes the order requires48 and whether those changes can be
accomplished by the defendants.4 9 To clarify the standards for de-
termining compliance with a court order, the master often functions as
an arbitrator. He will, if necessary, offer an interpretation of the order
that is in practice binding on the parties.50 Because the parties are
the parties consented to surprise visits, indicating a greater degree of formality. Id. at 2.
(2) The background of the special master. See, e.g., Annual Report of Special Master
on Defendants' Compliance with Court Orders at 2, Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp.
956 (D.R.I. 1977) (correctional administrator appointed) [hereinafter cited as Annual Re.
port of Special Master]; D. SPILLER, AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES
IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS-A CASE STUDY OF Hamilion v. Schiro 3 (1976) (law professor
appointed).
(3) Timing of the master's entry into the case. Masters appointed immediately after
prison conditions are declared unconstitutional are usually instructed to formulate relief.
See Jordan v. Wolke, 75 F.R.D. 696, 701 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (order of reference); Hamilton
v. Schiro, No. 60-2443 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 1971) (same).
(4) Filing of an appeal of the order of reference.
45. See note 41 supra (examples of broadly framed powers of master).
46. All of the masters interviewed stated that they had received little informal direction
from the judge concerning their duties or their role. See, e.g., Master A at 2-3; Master B
at 1. Most literature refers only to the traditional role of hearing officers and the appro-
priateness of a reference. See note 36 supra.
47. The master will often react to particular inadequacies or requests presented by
attorneys, inmates, staff, and administrators. The nature of his response may depend on
his perception of the master's role, the stage of the litigation, and the parties' willingness
to allow him to participate.
The breadth of the issues before the master in a prison case stems from the ambiguity of
and controversy over the standard of "cruel and unusual punishment," U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII, the group nature of the parties, the future orientation of the relief, and the
magnitude of the task of compliance. See Chayes, supra note 4, at 1302.
48. See Annual Report of Special Master, supra note 44, at 38-39, 54-60 (parties contest
meaning of court order requiring "adequate" mental health care and "sufficient" job
opportunities for over six months).
49. See id. at 15 (master recognizes time requirement for separation of pretrial de-
tainees from convicted inmates too short; placing pretrial detainees elsewhere declared
unavailable, unsafe, or economically infeasible); Taylor v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241, 1260
app. (N.D. Ohio 1978) (Fifth Report of Special Master) (master reports defendants' at-
tempts to comply with requirements of order created serious problems in infirmary;
modification necessary).
50. If either party has taken a position that the master deems inadequate to satisfy the
order, he often attempts to persuade the parties to compromise. See, e.g., Master A at 4
("From the very beginning, we negotiated everything from the number of people to stay
in maximum security to the date [the move] was to be done.") If parties do not agree to
an interpretation acceptable to the master and the court, then the master develops and
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aware that the master will impose a decision if they fail to agree, he can
encourage them to reach agreement on an interpretation of the order
that is acceptable to the court.
The master will sometimes find that there are conflicts between the
parties over issues unrelated to the interpretation of the order 5' and
that such conflicts threaten to impede implementation. He may attempt
to act as an intermediary both to facilitate communication and to
sustain the momentum of efforts to achieve compliance.5 2
Masters sometimes perceive that the prison administrator either can-
not or will not provide the direction necessary to achieve compliance. 53
They may respond by assuming the role of adviser to the parties.54
Masters have also attempted to carry out administrative functions such
as formulating plans to address problems,55 seeking grants and other
imposes an interpretation. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 440 F. Supp. 60, 155 app. (N.D.
Ohio 1977) (First Report of Special Master) (clarifying court requirements for visitation);
Letter from Master A to Correctional Consultants (Apr. 5, 1978) (informing consultants of
meeting designed to "develop minimal standards which the Court can employ in moni-
toring compliance"). The master's authority and willingness to impose judgments defines
his role as that of an arbitrator, rather than a mediator. See p. 1086 infra.
The master's recommendations are not legally binding on the court. See FED. R. Civ. P.
53(e). As a practical matter, the master's decisions concerning standards of compliance
often prevail. Compare Letter from Master to Warden (June 9, 1977) (indicating master's
and court's position concerning job assignment system and inmate council) with Taylor
v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241, 1245-54 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (Agreement and Order) (court
adopts similar position concerning inmate council, job assignment system, and grievance
mechanism).
51. See, e.g., Director C at 2-3 (lawyers do not understand aspects of prison ad-
ministration and should not control case); Plaintiffs' Attorney C at 23 (warden bears great
deal of resentment toward lawyer because of aggravation resulting from case). Antagonisms
may be fostered by the issue of attorneys' fees. See, e.g., id. at 21-22 (dispute over fees
contributed to attorney's decision to minimize involvement and rely on master to initiate
action). Plaintiffs' counsel may perceive that defendants are not acting in good faith and
develop hostility toward them. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Attorney A at 11; Master B at 23-24.
52. See, e.g., Defendants' Attorney C at 3 (master aided progress of litigation by
facilitating communication between counsel). This role may entail setting the pace of the
compliance process. See Deputy Master A at 2:
I do plaintiffs' and defendants' work. On the jobs issue, the defendants come up with
a list that says everyone's got a job. The administration then doesn't know which job
is "bogus." I'll go and talk to every inmate in there, and on the basis of that, I'll
make recommendations to the administration and the court. [This] does plaintiffs'
counsel's work, and tells the administration what's going on.
53. See, e.g., Annual Report of Special Master, suPra note 44, at 75 (absence of com-
petent administrative management team responsible for continued problems); Master B
at 51 ("The court cannot rely on defendants. If they wanted to do it, they would have
done it long ago. If they come up with anything, they'll come up with plans that are
totally unworkable [and] unrealistic .... ")
54. See, e.g., Report Concerning Defendants' Compliance as of February 10, at 21,
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977) (master advises defendants of way
to improve classification system).
55. See, e.g., Annual Report of Special Master, supra note 44, at 73 (master's efforts to
provide technical assistance for development of grievance procedures); Letter from Master
D to Consultant (Feb. 28, 1972) (requesting technical assistance to determine structure
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forms of assistance to establish new programs, 56 and forming advisory
policy groups among inmates and staff.57 Finally, when other methods
fail, masters have functioned as enforcement agents. They have acted
formally by instituting proceedings to sanction noncompliance," and
informally by advising the defendants of the court's dissatisfaction
and the likelihood of more drastic judicial action.5 9
Thus, in addition to performing his traditional fact-finding function
the master in prison litigation often attempts to function as arbitrator,
intermediary, advisor, administrator, and enforcer. There are, however,
inevitable constraints on the master and conflicts between these roles
that often prevent their successful performance.
II. The Insufficiency of the Master as Intervenor
In reforming prisons, courts often order substantial changes that
cannot be achieved unless patterns of interaction within the prison are
transformed.60 Although the master in some cases can serve as a catalyst
for change, the ways in which courts and masters act and are perceived
by the parties can prevent the master from promoting new patterns of
interaction. Even when it is limited to those functions that he can
perform, the master's role may create problems that impair the effec-
tiveness and legitimacy of judicial intervention during implementation
of the decree.
and function of newly planned prison); Final Report of Special Master In re Orleans
Parish Prison at 16, Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970) (master recom-
mends major reorganization of prison administration).
56. See, e.g., Letter from Master B to Director of National Institute of Corrections
(Mar. 8, 1978) (requesting funds for evaluation of grievance system); Letter from Master
B to Consultant (Dec. 9, 1976) (summarizing master's role in obtaining grant to develop
psychological test for screening correctional officers).
57. See, e.g., Master B at 16 (master formed inmate advisory council); Memo from
Master A to Prison Staff (Dec. 8, 1977) (informing staff of formation of advisory group).
One master noted:
I spent an awful lot of time working with inmates individually and collectively,
basically in the hope of stimulating them into understanding that there were some
positive, constructive ways we could go about bringing about change, and that work-
ing with the court was the most sensible way to do it at this time. I also worked with
the [correctional] officers in terms of what they perceived their needs to be, and did
some work in developing some ways of meeting their needs.
Master A at 6-7.
58. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82, 85 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (empowering master to
seek contempt citation for defendants' failure to comply with order).
59. See, e.g., Letter from Master A to Director A (Mar. 8, 1978) (informing director of
problems confronted in course of monitoring); Letter from Master C to Director C (May
11, 1976) (reminding that psychological screening was ordered by court and that master
would take formal action if necessary).
60. See pp. 1066-67 suPra.
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A. Need for Constructive Dispute Resolution
The transformation of the patterns of interaction necessary for
prison reform cannot be achieved by decree. 61 Such patterns are so
integral to the daily routine of the prison that staff and inmate partic-
ipation in resolving disputes between members of the prison com-
munity is necessary. 2 Adjudication, which provides for dispute resolu-
tion in an adversary proceeding with an outsider presiding, 3 is unlikely
to be effective because the process remains separate from and foreign
61. To reduce violence courts sometimes require administrators to increase the surveil-
lance of inmates and to use more repressive measures against them. See C. SILBERMAN,
supra note 7, at 381-82. These measures reinforce the system of governance that has
contributed to violent conditions and fail to provide for the protection of inmates from
each other.
Some of the worst abuses in prisons, such as torture and filthy, dark, vermin-infested
isolation cells, have been eliminated by judicial intervention. R. GoLDFARB & L. SINGER,
AFrER CoNvIcToN 370-403 (1973). Coercive intervention appears to be necessary to provide
a constituency for inmates so that resources and energy are devoted to improving prison
conditions.
Court intervention raises a number of theoretical and practical problems. First, the
physical improvements ordered may not persist over time, due to failure of prison of-
ficials to structure adequate incentives for inmates and staff to maintain conditions.
When the level of hostility between members of the prison community is high, destruction
of physical property may be the only perceived means of expressing this hostility.
Second, because legislators are resentful of federal-court intervention in the political
process, see Assistant to Sheriff D at 18, they may refuse to allocate funds to implement
the court's orders. Third, court-ordered expenditures have engendered a controversy over
the proper role of courts in a federal system. See, e.g., Frug, The Judicial Power of the
Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715 (1978); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of
Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978). Finally, court-ordered improve-
ments of antiquated facilities may predispose legislatures to devote resources to maintain-
ing large institutions rather than to developing less destructive, more humane, community-
based programs.
62. Disputes may arise over the unfair treatment of an inmate by a guard, over an
inmate's sense that his pride has been compromised by the behavior of a guard or another
inmate, or over a policy that a group of inmates perceives to be unfair, e.g., inadequate
visiting privileges, unavailability of ethnic or religious foods, unequal worship services, or
unfair classification procedures. See Mediation Agreement between Administration of
Washington State Reformatory and Representatives of the Resident Ethnic Groups (Jan.
28, 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Washington Mediation
Agreement].
63. Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 63, 69 (1974). In adjudication, the "persuasive conflict" that occurs before the arbiter
is an offshoot of a dispute that precedes the dispute-settling process. Golding, Prelimi-
naries to the Study of Procedural Justice, in LAw, REASON, AND JUsTICE 71, 86 (G. Hughes
ed. 1969). The technical nature of adjudication often limits the disputants' capacity to
participate effectively, so that each disputant participates through an intermediary (usually
a lawyer) who assumes a large degree of control. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through
Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637, 659 (1976). Ad-
judication presupposes that the "binding" decision of the adjudication will "resolve" the
dispute.
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to those directly affected.64 Moreover, adjudication may impair rela-
tionships when the parties resume their normal roles.65
There is a need for a constructive dispute-resolution process that
provides a forum for airing disputes within the prison community,
opens channels of communication so that mutual understanding can
develop, and helps provide a favorable atmosphere for confronting and
settling issues. 0 Although the master attempts to perform various in-
formal roles aimed at improving the parties' day-to-day interactions, his
efficacy will depend on their attitudes toward judicial intervention and
willingness to cooperate. 67
B. The Parties' Lack of Faith in the Process
The parties are not committed to judicial intervention as a way of
addressing prison problems. The defendants frequently question the
court's legitimacy, and hence the master's continuing involvement in
what they consider to be a responsibility of the executive branch.("
Their resistance to judicial intervention is initially reflected in their
failure to accept the seriousness of the court's demands and their sub-
64. See Felstiner, supra note 63, at 71 ("The psychological consequence [of the ad-
judicative process] is frequently to alienate the loser. ... ) The person-oriented factors
in the dispute, such as political alliances within the prison or the intensity of inmates'
dissatisfaction with a seemingly trivial practice, may be crucial to settlement of the
dispute, but are likely to be considered irrelevant by an arbiter. Id. at 70.
65. Prison officials, who are subjected to public scrutiny and criticism, are likely to
feel hostile toward those who are challenging their actions, namely the inmates. See Eisen-
berg, supra note 63, at 660 (prospect of "judgment [recognizing one party as 'right' and
branding other as 'wrong'], coupled with the lack of control leading up to the judgment,
tends both to generate a state of tension and to drive the disputants irreconcilably apart,
whatever the outcome"). Inmates are returned to the custody of the opposing parties in
the litigation, creating a situation ripe for continuing hostility and reprisals. Greenwald,
C.R.S.: Dispute Resolution Through Mediation, 64 A.B.A.J. 1250, 1254 (1978); cf. M.
DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 351-52 (1973) (calling such competitive modes of
problemsolving "destructive conflict," characterized by tendency to expand and escalate).
66. The process of dispute resolution is as important as the outcome in the prison
context, for one of the sources of the conflict is the absence of mechanisms for dealing
with problems. See pp. 1064-66 supra.
67. See Project, Judicial Intervention in Corrections: The California Experience-An
Empirical Study, 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 452, 529-30 (1973); cf. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAw 216-21 (rev. ed. 1969) (adherence to law depends on interlocking expectations and
voluntary collaboration of lawmaker and governed); Hazard, Law-Reforming in the Anti-
Poverty Effort, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 242, 248-50 (1970) (necessity of maintaining legitimacy
limits judicial lawmaking).
68. See, e.g., ACI Jobs top list of Moran's concerns, Providence J., July 10, 1978, at
A-3, col. 5 (Department of Corrections Director said "[s]ometimes I think that courts in
general go beyond basic human needs .... and begin to dictate things that really should
be left to the individual state"); Proposals For Jail Visitation, Discipline Opposed By
Sheriff, Toledo Blade, Jan. 6, 1978, at 15, col. 4 (sheriff contended that master was in-
terfering in matters that should be left to administrative judgment of staff). See generally
Kimball & Newman, Judicial Intervention in Corrections Decisions: Threat and Response,
14 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 1, 7-9 (1968). Elected officials express the view that their
responsibility is to the people, not the federal court or the master. See, e.g., Sheriff B at I.
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sequent inattention to the substance of the court decree.6 9 When the
master imposes demands that require a change in policy or an increase
in expenditures, defendants often become hostile toward the court and
the master.70 They develop the view that every controversial judicial
action presents an opportunity to challenge the court's authority.7 1
69. See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F. Supp. 659, 664 (D.R.1. 1978) (contempt
opinion and order) (enforcing 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977)) (staff responsible for
implementing court-ordered reclassification not informed of duties and took no action to
implement order until contempt hearing); D. SPILLER, supra note 44, at 3 (reporting de-
fendants' failure to take lawsuit seriously during initial stages).
Although some judges and commentators have viewed defendants' decision not to ap-
peal the court's order as a form of cooperation, see Prison Reform: The Judicial Process,
23 CRm.5. L. RrP. (BNA) 3 (Supp. Aug. 2, 1978), defendants formal position is not neces-
sarily an indication of their acceptance of the legitimacy of court intervention. Officials
may decide not to appeal an order for a range of strategic and political reasons. See, e.g.,
Director C at 4 (appeal withdrawn as concession of defendants in plea-bargaining session
following criminal contempt charges for noncompliance); Plaintiffs' Attorney C at 2
(implying that defense counsel had inadequate resources for appeal); Warden C at 1
(indicating that he was pressured by his superiors who were not named defendants to
accept consent order).
70. See Master A at 8:
The new director . . . turned out to be as defensive about the court's order as the
original director . . . . [O]ther directors, commissioners of corrections, and wardens
... have frankly admitted that, even when the court has come down with an order
with which they were in agreement, the fact that it was imposed on them made them
react negatively to it.
This hostility stems in part from the perception of prison administrators and staff that
the court and master are challenging their authority and control, thereby limiting their
ability to manage. See Sheriff B at I:
[The master] has completely taken the ability of the sheriff's department and correc-
tions in general away from the sheriff, because I can set no goals. He dictates the
goals, the direction in which I must go, and he jumps from one goal to another...
I'm like a ship without a sail. I'm just drifting because I can't logically progress
toward a goal.
Administrators express resentment that the master imposed decisions, but did not bear
responsibility for misjudgments. See, e.g., id. at 1-2 ("The ultimate thing is that he can
say all kinds of things and require all kinds of things, but I . . . will take the ultimate
responsibility, not the special master. He has all the goodies and none of the problems.");
Warden C at I (indicating resentment that prison officials' judgment viewed as "self-
serving," but same decision by court viewed as "law-serving"). Administrators' resentment
is compounded by their sense that the court and the master are naive about the problems
and limitations of prison administration. See id. at 4 ("[The master] is not knowledgeable
enough of the corrections system. Courts have problems understanding why we do things.
That can't be learned in a book.")
Some administrators have welcomed court decisions as a means of reforming prisons.
See, e.g., D. SPILLER, supra note 44, at 36 (sheriff was "friendly" defendant and used court
suit to effectuate prison reform). Administrators who have used this approach have some-
times encountered resistance from their superiors or from the legislature. See id. at 47.
71. See, e.g., Letter from Master B to Sheriff B at 3 (Oct. 11, 1977) (master troubled
by defendants' suggestion that development of effective psychological test was beyond
scope of order); Memorandum in Support of Application for Rehearing, Hamilton v.
Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (challenging most provisions in court order as
sole responsibility of Sheriff, or as beyond scope of court's authority).
The litigiousness of the defendants may increase if court intervention does not subside
after the most serious violations have been addressed. See, e.g., Assistant to Director A at
I ("As we went along I wasn't sure that we were talking about the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment. [The master] just became a thorn in our side."); Minutes of Meeting
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If defendants maintain this antagonistic posture, the master is pre-
vented from promoting a cooperative approach to implementation. De-
fendants are often unwilling to involve the master actively in the
resolution of the prison's problems;7 2 they will tolerate the master's
presence, but will attempt to structure channels of communication that
minimize his "disruptive" effect by depriving him of the opportunity
to identify and address problems.73
Inmates and their attorneys also have resisted the use of the imple-
mentation process to confront internal problems. Inmates often appear
more concerned with the court's implicit recognition of their status as
individuals with inalienable rights than with the outcome of a particu-
lar legal issue.74 Some apparently believe that federal court support
significantly enhances their power in the institution.7 Thus, inmates
sometimes insist on confronting every issue, rather than attempting to
compromise.7 6
A§ the decree implementation process proceeds, plaintiffs sometimes
become increasingly disillusioned with the court and the master be-
of Ad Hoc Committee on Corrections (Columbus, Ohio Apr. 20, 1976) (director said that
court was nitpicking, and that prison was in compliance with significant standards in
court order) (minutes on file with Yale Law Journal).
72. See Master A at 7 (director requested master not to bring in any more experts to
"mess the situation up for him"); Letter from Defendants' Attorney B to Master B (June
5, 1978) (requesting master not to become involved in forming new program).
73. See, e.g., Letter from Master A to Director A (May 3, 1978) (reiterating master's
willingness to honor director's desire to have control of all departmental matters, al-
though master reminds director of his unlimited access to staff and facilities); Director of
Treatment B at I ("I used to have direct contact with him. Not any more. We only deal
through attorneys, because there were too many problems.") In some systems prison ad-
ministrators have appointed institutional liaison officers to handle all communication
with the master and the court. See Institutional Liaison Officer B at I (indicating that
he had no line authority or institutional responsibilities other than to keep master
happy). But see Taylor v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241, 1255-56 app. (N.D. Ohio 1978) (Fifth
Report of Special Master) (master notes spirit of cooperation that has characterized de-
fendants' behavior).
74. See R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, supra note 61, at 360 ("Fundamental to [inmates'
grievances] is a desire to be treated with some measure of personal dignity."); Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW
& Soc'y REv. 95, 137 (1974) ("have-nots" often litigate to achieve symbolic rather than
material gratification, which undermines their ability and enthusiasm to achieve tangible
gains). The emphasis on inmate rights may derive in part from the administration's un-
willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of inmate participation.
75. See, e.g., Deputy Master A at 3 ("As soon as the court issues a decree, the attitude
of the inmates is 'I've got you.' "); Warden C at 1 (inmates who bring suits do so
primarily for personal gain); cf. COMMUNITY DISPUTE SERvIcES, AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOcIATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INMATE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE IN RHODE ISLAND 43 (1977) (inmate councils in control of
dispute-resolution process may create real or perceived power blocs within institution).
76. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Attorney C at 2:
I held a meeting with [inmates], at which I announced to them that I'd just about
negotiated a consent decree with the attorney general's office .... They were out-
raged at a consent decree on anything. They did not want to consent, to be sold out
as they believed it. They wanted a battle. They wanted a fight ....
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cause of the persistence of arbitrary treatment by guards and prison
officials, violent conditions, and the destructive relationships under-
lying both phenomena. 77 They may perceive that the court is reluctant
to deal directly with inmates or to impose sanctions on defendants for
clear violations of the court order, and may infer that the court accepts
the current status of inmates in the prison social structure. In such a
situation, inmates will tend to conclude that the court is not fulfilling
its role as protector of constitutional rights,ra and counsel will lose the
motivation and patience necessary to explore methods of problem-
solving through the decree implementation process.7 9 Plaintiffs may
eventually become unwilling to cooperate with the master's attempts
to function as intermediary, adviser, or administrator within the
prison. 0
C. Limitations Imposed by the Adversary System
During implementation, the nature of the adversary process also
defines the role of the master and the parties; the opposing sides per-
77. See Inmate A-I at 1 (expressing frustration, disappointment, and sense that he was
getting squeezed out of litigation and had little access to master except on infrequent
prison inspections, and that nothing that affected inmates' daily lives had changed since
court intervened).
78. Plaintiffs' Attorney A at 1:
mhe sort of order we received... raises hopes so high among prisoners that if things
don't change for the better within a relatively reasonable period of time, the dashing
of hopes is much more destructive than never having created the hopes, and it also
very much calls into question in prisoners' minds either the effectiveness of the
judicial system or the willingness of the judicial system to really act in their behalf.
79. See Plaintiffs' Attorney C at 3 ("It was only the next few years which taught me
that all I'd produced were a bunch of pieces of paper."); Master D at 1 (plaintiffs' counsel
was frustrated and dissatisfied with progress and seemed to lose interest). Plaintiffs' at-
torneys will often tend to view issues in terms of legal principles and political ideals,
rather than in terms of satisfying their clients' interests. See Plaintiffs' Attorney C at 3
(identifying Constitution as his other client); M. Hermann, Rhem v. Malcolm: A Case
Study of Public Interest Litigation: Pre-trial Detention 48 (May 1977) (unpublished
Harvard Law School thesis) (describing failure of plaintiffs' counsel to represent interests
of inmates adequately); cf. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client In-
terests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 483 (1976) (describing "rights"
orientation of plaintiffs' attorneys in school desegregation cases). In some situations they
will refuse to negotiate because of a desire to avoid compromising those ideals, or to
establish what they believe to be a desirable constitutional standard. See Plaintiffs' At-
torney A at I:
[P]laintiffs have said, "We don't have to give ground because we're 100% right." At
least that's the plaintiffs' perception, and legally, they've never been proven wrong
when they've taken that stand .... They may not have gotten the relief they wanted,
but in fact they were right. There was no reason to compromise their position.
80. See Deputy Master A at 2 ("My relationship with inmates is far more fragile.
There's been a year of the master, and as far as the inmates are concerned, nothing has
happened. They are hostile. They're not even interested in talking to me."); Master D at
1 (plaintiffs' counsel frustrated, and turned from conciliatory to adversary position in
hearing).
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ceive themselves as competing for a favorable decision.8' The adver-
sarial presentation of issues places prison officials in a defensive pos-
ture.8 2 The intervention of counsel often accentuates the adversary
presentation"3 and predisposes parties to avoid dealing directly with
the needs, demands, and objections of the other side. 4 The polariza-
tion of the opposing parties obscures and intensifies their conflicts, 5
and diverts resources from identifying and confronting issues.,,
The master is likely to find that he must accept and work with power
relationships that precede court involvement.87 Inmates and guards
who are not active in the litigation are unlikely to call the court's at-
81. See notes 63-65 supra.
82. See, e.g., Assistant to Director A at 1:
It's hard to stay level headed when you're getting your rear-end kicked. I looked at
[the master] as an adversary.... We took it on the chin, knowing that you're going
to be held in contempt [and it would be] all over the front page. It builds up natural
animosity, and you look at the people who present the evidence as an adversary.
83. See, e.g., Letter from Master B to Sheriff B (Oct. 11, 1977) (defense attorney's
strategy of treating master as opposing counsel called "counter productive"). Counsel
often have separate organizational interests that may determine their stance in the case.
See, e.g., Bell, supra note 79, at 488-93 (discussing ideological and psychological basis for
principled approach of plaintiffs); Defendants' Attorney A at 1 (Attorney General wants
to minimize involvement in prison litigation because of adverse political response).
84. Plaintiffs' Attorney C at 3 (defendants' report, prepared by Attorney General's
office, "almost wholly conclusory," making it impossible to tell whether changes made).
Defendants sometimes challenge the plaintiffs' proposals on the basis that they are not
required by the Constitution or the decree, rather than because they are not needed. See,
e.g., Brief of Defendant Board of County Commissioners at 3, Jones v. Wittenberg, 330
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (questioning whether additional plumbers are required by
order).
85. See Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 941
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976) ("resolution of disputes by litigation, due
to the combatant win or lose attitude of litigants, generally has the effect of driving the
parties further apart instead of bringing them together"); Deputy Master A at 3 (litiga-
tion has made communication within prison even more difficult than under normal
circumstances).
86. The progress made by the defendants in Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956
(D.R.I. 1977), in instituting a jobs program is illustrative of this problem. The court
ordered defendants to create enough "meaningful" jobs to provide every inmate with the
opportunity to work. Id. at 988. The director also supported the establishment of jobs
for inmates. After 75 days at ACI, Moran can see changes, Providence J., May 14, 1978, at
1, col. 5. Plaintiffs agreed that idleness was one of the foremost concerns of inmates.
See Plaintiffs' Attorney at 2. Yet the parties subsequently engaged in a vigorous dispute
over what constitutes a meaningful job, whether jobs existed, and whose fault it was that
inmates remained idle one year after the order was entered. See Annual Report of Special
Master, supra note 44, at 36-54.
Some masters have attempted to minimize the antagonisms by avoiding formal hearings
and communication directly with prison officials and inmates. See, e.g., Final Report of
Special Master In Re Orleans Parish Prison at 4, Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F. Supp. 1016
(E.D. La. 1971). Although this process may reduce the level of disruption and resentment,
if the master imposes a decision on the defendants, they are likely to resume their ad-
versary stance. See note 70 suora.
87. Cf. D. HORowrrZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 38-45 (1977) (courts often forced
to deal with unrepresentative litigants); Galanter, supra note 74, at 137-38 (courts limited
to solutions within existing institutional framework).
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tention to their particular interests. 88 The master may deal, therefore,
primarily with named plaintiffs89 who, although often the most power-
ful and articulate inmates, are not necessarily representative of the
general population's interests.90 The defendants may insist that the
master restrict his involvement with staff and inmates to finding facts
about compliance with particular provisions of the order; he must then
rely on the administration to filter his decisions through the institu-
tion's hierarchy, 91 so that guards, counselors, and even wardens are
excluded from negotiating and decisionmaking 9 2
Adversary definition of issues also affects the accuracy and type of
information available to the master and the court. Plaintiffs are likely
to focus the court's and master's attention on violations of the order to
convince the court of the necessity of more drastic sanctions.93 The de-
fendants also may attempt to control the information available. They
often realize that a master attempting to function as intermediary, ad-
viser, or administrator will make judgments concerning the adequacy
of their compliance efforts.94 Prison officials have expressed fears of
being held personally liable for noncompliance, of retaliation by their
superiors for revealing damaging information, and of losing their jobs
88. Inmates with short prison terms and strong ties to the outside community are
unlikely to develop power within the prison, see note 16 supra, are not usually concerned
with long-term change, and, because they lack power in the inmate community, are
particularly vulnerable to retaliation by guards for court involvement. Inarticulate and
passive inmates, who are also more vulnerable to retaliation, may be unaware of the
court's intervention or reluctant to assume the position of visibility accompanying involve-
ment.
89. Inmate A-2 at I (inmates who are neither named plaintiffs nor "head honchos"
never knew what was going on and never saw anyone from court).
90. See notes 16-17 supra.
91. See note 11 supra. Defendants may base their attempt to restrict the master's in-
volvement on formal limitations of his role. Although masters often have unlimited
access to the prison, as well as authority to conduct confidential interviews with staff, see
p. 1069 supra, in some instances access has been limited to investigation for specific
factfinding and enforcement purposes. See Judge E at 2 (limited purpose of master's in-
spections). Prison officials can often impose de facto restrictions on the master's involve-
ment by refusing to cooperate with his informal functions and by withholding informa-
tion. Because of his dependence on the defendants' cooperation, the master will often
accede to defendants' requests for limited involvement. See note 73 supra.
92. Line staff and lower management rarely participate in negotiations with the
master and are usually informed of outcomes of the negotiations through the normal
chain of command. See, e.g., Director of Treatment B at 3 (order of master processed
through normal chain); Defendants' Attorney C at 1 (only involvement of staff is to
supply information).
93. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Attorney D at I (plaintiffs look for and vigorously present
violations of order); Plaintiffs' Attorney A at 3 (plaintiffs point out violations of order
to court even when compliance deadlines have not yet expired).
94. See, e.g., Assistant to Director A at I ("When [the master] was down here on a
factfinding tour, I knew that much of the stuff would bury us at court."); M. HAmIs,
suPra note 31, at 48 (reporting staff's fear of master because he acted in place of judge).
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due to judicial dissatisfaction with their performance. 95 They may,
therefore, avoid informing the master of problems underlying their
failure to achieve compliance, 96 and may thereby limit his understand-
ing of the reasons for their failure.
If the parties perceive that the information available to the master is
not a true reflection of prison conditions, their resulting lack of con-
fidence in the master will limit his capacity to mediate effectively.
Furthermore, the parties often draw conclusions about the master's
allegiances from his reliance on the other side for information.97 In
such situations, the parties will perceive the master as biased and will
refuse to cooperate with his informal efforts. 98
The adversary mode will also affect the master's capacity to frame
effective remedies. Administrative problemsolving strategies are appro-
priate in the prison context because the problems necessitate continual
adjustments of procedures and relationships. The decisionmaker must
use a systemic approach to define the problem accurately, to establish
objectives, and to create incentives for individuals to achieve those ob-
jectives. The adversary process prevents the master from using that
approach to prison problems.99 Instead, he will respond to specific
95. The sense of vulnerability is especially noticeable when the court has used or
threatened to use its power to transfer or remove particular staff members. See, e.g.,
Director C at 5 (director informed staff that they were all in jeopardy of being personally
held in contempt); Defendants' Attorney A at 1:
The Director's fear was the Department's fear: that at any time he would be fired.
The staff thought, if that guy fires the Director, who's going to come in then? ...
[The master] didn't recognize the feeling that the Department was out on a limb and
that he would be the one to cut it off. He was a guy who could take away their liveli-
hood.... People wouldn't talk to [the master] for fear the administration would take
action against them.
96. See, e.g., Defendants' Attorney A at 1 (staff avoided master and gave him misinfor.
mation); cf. Felstiner, supra note 63, at 75 (tendency of parties to restrict communication
with third-party decisionmaker to matters that they believe will promote their own
interests).
97. Some prison officials view the master with suspicion, because he communicates
openly with inmates. See, e.g., Defendants' Attorney A at 2. A similar reduction in
credibility may occur among inmates if the master attempts to cooperate with prison
officials. See, e.g., Inmate A-1 at 1 (fear that master would believe reports of prison ad-
ministration and accept as genuine defendants' "sham" compliance). Information often
assumes symbolic meaning in a prison, and the master's efforts to maintain neutrality by
treating all members of the prison community equally violates established patterns of
communication. See generally E. GOFFNAN, supra note 19, at 7-9.
98. See, e.g., Sheriff B at 3 ("When he gets out of what the original order said, we
have to say, 'That's not in the original order, so it's none of your business.' ")
99. In framing the remedy, the master does not ask, "What is the problem here and
how can we solve it?" but rather "What does the order mean and what measurable
changes must take place to achieve compliance?" See, e.g., Master A at 7-8 (describing
process of transforming broad, ambiguous order into specific provisions that could be
monitored); Master D at 1 (indicating that he established priorities for decree and focused
on developing specific provisions in areas he deemed most important); cf. L. FULIXR,
supra note 67, at 172 ("To act wisely, the economic manager must take into account every
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conditions by developing minimal standards and by requiring that
those standards be met. 00 He lacks the power to modify the prison's
internal delegation of responsibility for defining and solving prob-
lems.101
This process often results in artificial or partial solutions to com-
plex problems,10 2 so that the parties feel that the problems that pre-
cipitated the lawsuit remain after technical compliance is achieved.' 03
In addition, the adversary process discourages the court and the master
from considering the impact of the order on prisons outside its juris-
diction. 0 4 As a result, state officials will sometimes perceive the im-
plementation process as merely transferring problems from one prison
to another. 05
circumstance relevant to his decision and must make himself assume the initiative in
discovering what circumstances are relevant .... The judge, on the other hand, acts upon
those facts that are in advance deemed relevant under declared principles of decision.")
100. For example, in Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), additional
relief granted, 440 F. Supp. 60 (N.D. Ohio 1977), the court found, inter alia, that violence
in the prison violated inmates' constitutional rights. 323 F. Supp. at 99-100. To remedy
the situation, the master interpreted the order to require two guards on every floor, 24-
hours each day, and focused his enforcement efforts on maintaining this minimum
standard. 440 F. Supp. at 114-29. The master did not address the issue of informal bar-
gaining relationships or destructive patterns of communication. For other examples, see
Master's Report Concerning Defendants' Compliance as of February 10, at 20-21,
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977) (master recommends that de-
fendants take specific steps to achieve compliance and that court impose sanction for
failure to comply); Letter from Master B to Warden B (Oct. 11, 1977) (insisting on
compliance with agreement concerning posting notices).
101. Although the master does have authority to carry out specific administrative
functions, such as planning, he lacks the formal power to assume general administrative
responsibility for the execution of plans. Parties can challenge the master's authority to
intervene in areas not specifically mentioned in the order. See note 71 supra.
102. See, e.g., Warden C at I (court's solution to racial segregation was to assign beds
according to race, allowing Spanish inmates to be treated as "wild cards" (either black
or white)); Defendants' Attorney C at 1 (court's solution to problem of guard brutality
was to develop experimental psychological screening test for guards; problem of strained
working conditions, inadequate training, and hostile relationships with inmates not
addressed); ci. Levin, Education, Life Chances and the Courts. The Role of Social Science
Evidence, LAw & CONTE.IP. PROB., Summer 1975, at 217 (limited usefulness of social science
evidence in aiding courts to develop solutions to complex social problems).
103. See, e.g., Defendants' Attorney C at 1-2:
The clients think they've been taken down the road. I don't agree. They say they've
been in the litigation for 10 years. They've paid the special master somewhere be-
tween $50,000 and 9100,000. They've paid the plaintiffs' counsel somewhere between
$30,000 and $50,000. They've paid defense counsel $150,000. You're looking at between
R500,000 and $1,000,000. What are the most important things they have-a grievance
procedure and an inmate council, both of which were in existence before.
104. See, e.g., Special Master's Report on Overcrowding in Orleans Parish Prison at
34, Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972) (master recommends that local
sheriff be directed to refuse to accept 500 state inmates to deal with overcrowding prob-
lem caused by population limit imposed on only state institution by another district
court judge in separate case).
105. See Director C at 3 ("The April 9 order imposed a population limit. . .. They
were going to establish a prima donna institution out of all the institutions. At all the
other institutions, the ratio would continue to climb.")
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D. Problems Stemming from the Master's Multiple Roles
The master attempts to play a number of roles that require con-
flicting skills and relationships with the parties. In his informal ca-
pacity as intermediary, adviser, and administrator, the master attempts
to perform functions that require the consent of the parties, familiarity
with the problems and personalities of the prison, and involvement in
the daily interactions of the parties. In his formal capacity as fact-finder,
arbitrator, and enforcer, the master is expected to impose judgments
on the parties regardless of their consent. He must maintain a disin-
terested, impartial posture and provide the parties with equal op-
portunity to challenge his formal actions. If the formal and informal
roles conflict or are perceived by the parties to conflict, the master's
legitimacy and effectiveness will be compromised. 1 6
Confusion over the master's role in a particular situation can cause
tension among the parties. They may feel they have been treated un-
fairly when the master performs roles with conflicting purposes. Parties
will sometimes discuss problems informally with the master, and per-
ceive him to be performing an advisory or administrative role, only to
discover that their extemporaneous comments were used against them
in a compliance report. 10 7 In addition, a master's informal suggestions
may be interpreted as formal requirements for compliance. 08
Another source of confusion concerns the extent to which the master
can or should depart from his traditional role. Certain actions may
106. The time, energy, and training of the individual will affect his capacity to per-
form the master's role effectively. In some cases, masters continue to have major profes-
sional responsibilities elsewhere. Consequently, they must limit the extent of their partici-
pation, and in some cases break the momentum of implementation. See, e.g., Master D at
1 (complaining that other responsibilities of master took precedence for six months);
Master B at 2 (master will resume supervision when school year ends). There are few
active masters in prison litigation, and they are scattered throughout the country. See
notes 4 & 41 supra (citing cases). Masters reported having no preparation for the job and
little idea of what their roles would be at the outset of their tenure. See, e.g., Master A
at 6 ("I started with a base of ignorance and have experimented with different ap-
proaches."); Director C at 3 (master took year to become oriented).
107. See, e.g., Director of Treatment B at 1:
We used to deal on a direct basis, but you might say something and it might be
interpreted through [the master] to your superiors. Things you might have said in a
casual discussion, such as, "If you had five more men, could you run a recreation
program?" and you say "yes," and then it might come out, once you get to court or
once the parties and the master would be talking to someone else, "Well, the officer
says you should have five men."
108. The likelihood of confusion may increase in cases in which the master has the
power to supervise compliance, in addition to acting as investigator and hearing officer.
See, e.g., Case Work Supervisor B at I (describing confusion over status of visitation
program due to conflicting initiatives from special master and sheriff); Letter from
Sheriff B to Master B (Feb. 6, 1978) (expressing frustration at master's issuance of orders




impinge on his capacity to maintain the passive, impartial posture of a
fact-finder. 10 9 It is often unclear whether the master should act on his
own motion, 10 whether he should communicate ex parte with coun-
sel"' or the judge,ll 2 whether he should testify in the case,' 13 or
whether he can communicate with the media." 4 If the master takes an
activist view of his enforcement role, he will sometimes use the position
109. See, e.g., Director C at 4 (court's intervention was "complete, unbridled use of the
power of the court to force [the courts' and masters'] desires on the institution"); Warden
B at 1 ("I don't even look at the order any more. Its just negotiating with [the master]
as to what we can do. I don't know if he's looked at it either, because he's interpreted it
differently than anyone else would have interpreted it.")
110. A master may be granted specific power to move the court to hold defendants in
contempt for failure to comply with the decree. See Jones v. Wittenberg, 73 F.R.D. 82,
86 (N.D. Ohio 1976). Although the power granted in Jones did not lead to a formal con-
tempt motion by the master, masters sometimes informally initiate action by suggesting
to plaintiffs' counsel the existence of serious violations. See, e.g., Master B at 2-3 (in-
dicating master's role in initiating contempt action and consequent plea bargaining);
Plaintiffs' Attorney C at I ("I have really followed his wishes and advice on my role.")
Some of those interviewed said it was important that a master not assume responsibility
for initiating action so that he could maintain at least some neutrality. See, e.g., Master
D at 1 (plaintiff as activator in hearing process). But see Master A at 8 (master should have
authority to initiate action through counsel).
Ill. Masters and parties were ambivalent about whether there should be informal
communication between them, although participants indicated that some amount of in-
formal communication did take place. For example, see Master A at 8:
I tended to try to keep close contact with counsel on both sides. When I was working
full time, there wasn't a day in which I didn't talk to counsel for both sides. But the
more I did this, the more the parties depended on the fact that the master's office
was coordinating the whole process.
See Master D at I ("The special master became the focal point for the litigation. The
sheriff and I were in contact on a regular basis. I would talk to counsel and let them
know what I decided to do on priorities.") But see Judge E at 2 (indicating that ex parte
interviews compromised rights of parties, absent previous agreement).
112. Masters reported a significant amount of informal communication with the judge,
both about conditions in the prison and appropriate remedies. See Master A at 5 ("I would
also discuss [my ballpark estimates for compliance] extensively with the judge, and de-
termine whether, if that's where we came out, it would be acceptable to the court.");
Judge B at 10:
We've met periodically, as frequently, and when [the master] wants to meet ....
What we would usually do is before he would make these formal reports is he would
explore the problems and the things he was doing and the direction he was going.
He would either ask me for direction or he would suggest how he thought he should
move, and see if I would agree with the moves that he made.
Other masters indicated less frequent informal contact with the judge, although they did
communicate. See, e.g., Deputy Master A at 3.
113. Only one master reported testifying in court. See Master D at I ("I testify all the
time .... I sit next to plaintiff's attorney. He is the activator, and will put me on the
stand and ask me detailed questions .... ")
114. All participants tend to be concerned with press coverage, because it is the major
form of communication with the public. Cf. M. HARMS 9- D. SPILLER, AF-Er DEcISION:
IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREEs IN CORRECTIONAL SETTINGS 36-38 (1976) (role of media
coverage in case of judicial intervention in prison). Although the masters interviewed
reported differing levels of activism, most were willing to use the press as an informal
sanction and means of building public support for court intervention. See, e.g., Master D
at 1 (judge encouraged master to maintain ongoing relationship with press).
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of fact-finder and arbitrator to increase the effectiveness of his adminis-
trative and enforcement functions. 113 However, this may lead the master
to advocate a particular interpretation of the order and take steps to
ensure implementation that include consulting informally with the
judge and the parties. If the master actually helped formulate the com-
pliance plan, he will necessarily report to the court on the adequacy of
a program that he developed," 6 thus impairing his capacity to act as an
impartial hearing officer.
The master's advisory, intermediary, and enforcement roles are out-
side the court's visibility and control unless the parties formally chal-
lenge their legality." 7 This lack of accountability creates the possibility
of abuse," 8 a possibility that is likely to compromise the parties' per-
ception of the legitimacy of the judicial process. The master's report
to the court may contain both facts gathered in his formal capacity and
information gathered through his informal role. The entire report is
treated as findings of fact under Rule 53, subject to review according
to a clearly erroneous standard." 9 Parties do not have the opportunity
115. One master sought and obtained funds to develop an unprecedented psychological
testing device to screen correctional officers. This test was later incorporated into the
order, along with a number of other programs developed by the master. Agreement for
these provisions was obtained in conjunction with a criminal-contempt motion brought
by the court against the director of the department. In exchange for a continuance in the
contempt trial, the master obtained agreement from the director on almost every out-
standing issue in the case. See Director C at 4.
116. Although this problem may exist whenever a regulatory official establishes stan-
dards that he will then enforce, see K. DAvis, ADMISMATivE LAW TEXT § 13.01-.08 (3d
ed. 1972), the likelihood of bias and abuse is significantly increased by the activist nature
of the master's informal roles.
117. The absence of standards against which to measure the master's informal actions,
the absence of a record of such activity, the lack of precedent for the master's actions,
and the broad discretion afforded the master by the court make it difficult for the judge
to supervise the master's informal actions. The parties can challenge a formal action of
the master that allegedly exceeds the scope of his powers. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e). In
some instances, however, there are strong incentives not to challenge the authority or
decisions of the master. See, e.g., Plaintiffs' Attorney B at 1 ("Basically, we're letting the
master have his head. We're taking the issues he wants to take, we're stowing dis-
covery ... [Otherwise] we might have to go to a series of contempt hearings."); Director
C at 4 ("Whatever [the master] wants, give it to him.")
There are no provisions for challenging the master's informal actions, unless they are
included in the order of reference and appealed immediately following the master's ap-
pointment. See p. 1070 supra; cf. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 288-90 (5th Cir.
1977) (state challenged scope of informal powers of Human Rights Committee).
118. The master could, for example, use privileged information gathered in his in-
formal advisory capacity to influence decisions of the judge. He could reveal to the judge
what he believed were the plaintiffs' "real" motives for bringing the suit, or inform the
judge of what he considered examples of a particular individual's incompetence.
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e); see United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948) ("A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed.") If courts specify another standard of review in the
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to challenge the informally obtained findings until they go before the
judge. Moreover, judges are likely to follow the master's recommenda-
tions because of his relative familiarity with the case.12 0 This minimal
review provides little opportunity or incentive for the judge to scru-
tinize the master's findings.
Parties sometimes respond to the conflicts created by the master's
multiple roles by attempting to formalize all direct contact with the
master. 1 2 1 This response reduces the master's direct contact and famil-
iarity with the dynamics of the prison situation and increases the
formality of enforcement.
In sum, the master cannot fully compensate for the limitations on
courts' capacity to transform the patterns of communication and deci-
sionmaking in prisons. Moreover, his attempts to do so by combining
formal and informal roles can compromise the legitimacy of decree
implementation. Despite these problems, the potential usefulness of
masters in implementation justifies a reformulation of their roles in
light of a range of dispute-resolution techniques.
III. Suggested Reforms
The complex problems confronting prisons are unavoidable within
the current structure.! ' -' Ultimately, decisionmakers would be wise to
take a systemic view of the problems and direct energy and resources
away from prisons and toward less damaging sanctions, such as com-
munity-based facilities, restitution, and fines.'2 3 Short of such radical
order of reference, that standard will prevail. See, e.g., In re Van Sweringen Corp., 180
F.2d 119, 121 (6th Cir. 1950) (master's recommendations not given final or presumptive
effect); Carpenter, Babson & Fendler v. Condor Pictures, Inc., 110 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir.
1940) (master's findings purely advisory).
120. See, e.g., Judge B at 10 (judge did not recall any incidence of disagreement with
master's recommendations); Master A at 2 (judge willing to modify orders on master's
recommendation). Masters reported framing their recommendations within their sense of
what the judge would accept. See id. at 5 ("As time went along, I sensed where the judge's
limits were, and was able to deal with that without having to touch base with him in
advance."); Defendants' Attorney A at 2:
What [the master] says seems to be what the court ends up doing. It behooves you
that you try to get his support for it. When you sit down and talk about buildings,
[and] lie doesn't initially approve, before you would say, "Tough. I'll go into court."
... Now you must convince him that this is what would work best.
121. See, e.g., Sheriff B at 3 ("We felt the attorney had to be our buffer zone.")
122. See R. GOLDFARB & L. SINGER, supra note 61, at 526; Rothman, Decarcerating
Prisoners and Patients, Cw. LiB. REv., Fall 1973, at 8; cf. note 9 supra (courts believe some
deprivations inevitable).
123. See THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 11, at 165-66 (community-based facilities
can provide less expensive, more humane treatment for majority of offenders currently
incarcerated); THE EcoNoNusr, Sept. 16, 1978, at 53 (program to avoid use of institutions
for delinquents more humane, less costly, and almost equally effective as programs rely-
ing primarily on institutionalization).
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measures, the use of masters to reform prisons represents an attempt to
remain within the judicial system of dispute resolution and yet intro-
duce characteristics of more informal approaches. The flexibility and
breadth of the master's role often enables him to expedite fact-finding,
to coordinate information from various parts of the prison system, and
to use a variety of techniques to promote prison reform. 2 4
Yet the role of the master is limited because he has neither the tools
nor the mandate to restructure the patterns of decisionmaking and
behavior that perpetuate prison conditions. 12  Furthermore, the in-
crease in efficiency that results from the combination of roles in the
master is sometimes achieved at the expense of the perceived legitimacy
of the process. 12 6 Nevertheless, the use of masters should not be dis-
continued; instead, the master's role should be limited to situations in
which he is most likely to be effective. Moreover, the method of dispute
resolution employed in prisons should be tailored to the nature of the
dispute and the willingness of the parties to bargain.
A. Alternatives to Judicial Intervention
If prison officials acknowledge the need for change and the parties
demonstrate a willingness to bargain, then mediation and introduction
of grievance procedures are likely to be more effective in resolving
many disputes than litigation. 27 In mediation, a neutral, noncoercive
third party coordinates negotiations with the aim of identifying and
resolving issues of concern.' 28 The mediator establishes the framework
124. See pp. 1070-72 suPra.
125. See pp. 1076-81 suPra.
126. See pp. 1082-83 supra.
127. Mediation has enabled inmates and administration to reach mutually acceptable
settlements on numerous issues that would otherwise have resulted in litigation. See, e.g.,
Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911, 915 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976) (mediation undertaken pursuant to request of
judge culminated in binding agreement on access to religious services, public telephone
service, grievance procedures, and visiting privileges); Washington Mediation Agreement,
supra note 62 (agreement reached, inter alia, on method of representation at classification
meetings, recruitment of minority staff, availability of ethnic food and group celebrations,
visiting room policy, method of notification of status and eligibility for assignments, and
review process). Mediation has also promoted cooperative relationships between members
of the prison community that enable the development of participatory modes of problem-
solving. See Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911, 915 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 941
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976) (high level of rapport between authorities
and inmates resulted from negotiations, and "indoctrination of mediation" as viable and
permanent alternative to courts in resolving complaints of inmates).
Effective grievance procedures have been found to improve management, to deter
violence, and to promote justice and fairness in correctional institutions. See J. KEATING,
supra note 23, at 15-25.
128. Administrators have sought mediation at prisons in which an inmate protest is
imminent, a disruption has occurred, or a suit has been filed by inmates alleging violation
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and setting of the negotiations, 129 helps develop methods of selecting
representatives of the conflicting groups, 30 clarifies the areas of con-
flict,' 3' facilitates communication, 132 and encourages cooperative ap-
proaches to problemsolving. 133
A grievance mechanism is an ongoing internal system of negotiation
and dispute resolution.134 A grievance committee is usually composed
of equal numbers of inmates and staff under the chairmanship of a
neutral third party. Introducing and maintaining a grievance system
requires external assistance to train, evaluate, and provide outside re-
view of members of the committee. 35 Any inmate can invoke the
grievance mechanism by filing a complaint; the committee initially
determines if the complaint is "grievable,"' 36 and if it is, then attempts
to negotiate a settlement. If agreement is not reached, the committee
either recommends a course of action to the responsible official or, in
appropriate cases, imposes its own decision.' 37 The inmate may always
appeal the decision to an external review committee. 38
Despite their potential effectiveness, such informal techniques have
not been widely instituted.139 State and federal governments should
of their constitutional rights. See Holman, The Agencies Which Can Help: The Federal
Government's Role, 29 Bus. LAw. 1025, 1026-28 (1974).
Neutrality in mediation and adjudication requires different roles of third parties. In
adjudication the third party has the power to impose decision, so his role must include
guaranteeing each party a meaningful opportunity to present its case. The processes used
by a mediator to facilitate reconciliation cannot successfully be performed within this
framework. See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 24.
129. Paterson, The Agencies Which Can Help: Local Non-governmental Organizations,
29 Bus. LAw. 1017, 1023 (1974).
130. Greenwald, supra note 65, at 1252. The process for selecting inmate and staff
representatives is crucial to the success of the negotiations. The process must be regarded
as fair by the parties, and interest groups within the inmate population should be
broadly represented to avoid domination by any one group. See, e.g., id. at 1253.
131. See M. DEUTSCH, supra note 65, at 382-83 (mediator helps identify issues by such
techniques as interviewing parties separately and focusing discussion).
132. Id. at 383. This includes the responsibility of ensuring that the views of less
articulate parties are expressed and understood. Id.
133. The mediator promotes cooperation by recognizing the legitimacy of the parties
to the dispute, curbing unrealistic expectations, emphasizing the importance of developing
solutions based on mutual satisfaction, and suggesting potential agreements that could
be acceptable to both sides. Id. at 385-86.
134. To be effective, the mechanism must: (1) involve inmates and line staff in its
development and operation; (2) promptly respond, in written form, to all complaints, as
well as disclose reasons for all decisions; (3) provide for impartial external review; (4)
provide all inmates with access to the mechanism and guarantees against reprisal; (5)
apply to as broad a range of issues as possible; and (6) contain means for determining
whether a complaint is grievable. J. KE:ATING, supra note 23, at 9-12.
135. Id. at 12, 42-44.
136. Id. at 2, 12.
137. Id. at 11-12.
138. Id. at 10-11, 43-44.
139. See Holman, supra note 128, at 1028; Greenwald, supra note 65, at 1254. For a
compilation of various organizations that have served as mediators, see J. KEATING, supra
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create incentives for prisons to use mediation and grievance mecha-
nisms. 140 Granting agencies can designate their use as dominant factors
in funding decisions. In a case of prison violence, executive officials,
rather than creating a "blue ribbon" committee to investigate, can
more effectively prevent a recurrence by hiring a mediator to help the
parties resolve underlying disputes.' 41 Judges and lawyers can encour-
age alternative modes of dispute resolution by advising litigants to try
mediation before resorting to the courts. This procedure has been ef-
fectively employed in a number of cases.'142
There are, however, situations in which informal methods of dispute
resolution will not work. The court is sometimes called in precisely
because the parties are unwilling to cooperate with each other. Further-
more, even if the parties are willing to negotiate, mediation may be in-
effective in dealing with some issues, such as those involving changes
that are outside the control of the parties.
B. Development of a Proper Role of the Master
1. Situations in Which the Master Can Be Effective
When nonadversarial methods of resolution fail and litigation en-
sues, courts must intervene. 43 In situations in which administrators
have been unable or unwilling to intervene effectively and in which
major physical or program reforms are required, masters and courts
may be necessary as catalysts for change. 44 Moreover, the continuing
note 23, at 36. Although a 1974 survey indicated that out of 209 correctional institutions,
160 had a formal grievance procedure, many of these mechanisms were found to be "more
shadow than substance." McArthur, Inmate Grievance Mechanisms: A Survey of 209
American Prisons, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 1974, at 41, 46; see J. KEATING, supra note 23, at 15.
140. See H.R. 9400, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1978) (attorney general to promulgate
minimum standards for prison grievance mechanism and to develop certification pro-
cedure; requirement that inmates invoke grievance procedure prior to instituting suit
unless grievance not settled within 90 days).
141. Investigations by prominent laymen in the community have not been a successful
means of affecting internal prison conditions. See T. MURTON, THE DILEMMA OF PlISON
REFORm 82 (1976). Such committees may nevertheless perform the important function of
involving the community in prison problems.
142. See, e.g., Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911, 915 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 520
F.2d 941 (5th Cir., 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976) ("The fruits of these mediation
sessions culminated in a binding agreement . . . a higher level of rapport between the
authorities and the inmates, . . . [and] the indoctrination of mediation to both sides as a
potentially viable and permanent alternative to the courts in resolving the complaints of
inmates.")
143. See note 2 supra. Prison administrators should have strong incentive to develop
reasonable standards that can be respected by courts, legislatures, and administrative
agencies, for this process would afford them input into the criteria used to measure their
performance.
144. See M. HARRIS & D. SPILLER, suPra note 114, at 19-27.
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possibility of a court's imposition of coercive measures may serve as
incentive for administrators to develop standards and institute adequate
dispute-resolution mechanisms. 4 5
The master can enhance the immediate impact of judicial interven-
tion on otherwise uncooperative parties by serving as a visible reminder
of the court's jurisdiction. By appointing a master to participate in
implementation, the court can give the defendants an opportunity to
develop solutions gradually but leave open the possibility of future
sanctions. In prison systems in which there is insufficient knowledge
about possible programs or about the level of resources necessary to
meet court-imposed requirements, the master can play a useful role in
consulting experts and forcing prison officials to consider new ap-
proaches.
In some cases, however, the expertise and vigilance of a master may
not be sufficient to achieve compliance with the court's decree. If de-
fendants fail to assume their responsibility, the court may be unable
to force compliance without relying on other remedies such as imposing
fines for contempt of court,140 granting inmates' requests for dam-
ages,' 47 or ordering the prison to be closed.' 48
2. Procedural Reforms
Even in situations in which a master granted expanded authority can
perform a useful function, procedural reform is necessary to minimize
the possibility of unfairness and abuse created by the master's multiple
roles. One reform strategy is to separate the master's functions and dele-
gate them to different officials.' 49 This approach would eliminate role
confusion and clarify the master's duties. However, it would also re-
quire additional expenditures on regulation, rather than on improve-
ment of prison conditions, and would promote the bureaucratization of
the judiciary. Furthermore, separation of functions could decrease the
145. See J. KEATING, suPra note 23, at 22-23 (avoidance of litigation is powerful in-
centive for using grievance mechanisms). Several administrators stated that the specter of
court intervention "kept them on their toes" and prompted them to develop other ways
of improving prison conditions. See, e.g., Sheriff D at 25.
146. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973) (enforcing 333 F.
Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971)).
147. See Zagaris, Recent Developments in Prison Litigation: Procedural Issues and
Remedies, 14 SANTA CLARA LAW. 810, 815 (1974) (citing cases).
148. See Comment, Equitable Remedies Available to a Federal Court After Declaring
an Entire Prison System Violates the Eighth Amendment, 1 CAP. U.L. RIv. 101, 106-09(1972).
149. Cf. 1 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 1.09 (1958) (rejecting notion that
administrators cannot perform several overlapping functions).
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efficiency of fact-finding and the impact of the master as a catalyst for
change.
Another strategy for reducing unfairness and abuse would be to
maintain the current structure but institute procedural reforms that
would serve both to prevent the inappropriate intermingling of roles
and to clarify the master's functions. Increasing the extent of the
parties' participation could expedite implementation, provide prison
officials with access to expertise, and encourage fresh approaches to
prison administration. If the master is appointed immediately after
serious constitutional violations are found, he can involve the parties
at an early stage in reaching agreement on the requirements of relief
or he can develop reasonable standards when agreement cannot be
reached. Early involvement of the master also may minimize confusion
by enabling participants to develop a sense of their roles and duties.
Judges can increase the likelihood that the parties will be willing to
cooperate with the master by attempting to choose a full-time master
with the consent of the parties and by considering both parties' prefer-
ences regarding the master's professional orientation. Experience in
mediation or arbitration is an important consideration in selecting a
master, since it may train an individual to balance multiple roles.150
The master can enhance his capacity to persuade by informing the
parties early in the implementation process of what must be accom-
plished to achieve compliance. He can expedite implementation by
holding negotiating sessions on every section of the order at the be-
ginning of his tenure to establish clear, easily measured standards.
In order to reduce misunderstandings and confusion regarding inter-
pretation of the order and to encourage fair, reasonable relief, it is
important that, wherever possible, prison administrators and inmates
participate directly in the negotiations. Such direct involvement will
also expose staff and inmates to different views of the prison's problems
and may force them to rethink their approaches.
The judge can encourage clarification of roles and procedures by
framing the order of reference to state both the powers of and the
limitations on the master. Such specification is likely to induce the
parties to think carefully about the master's duties and his relation-
ships to the parties. It may also provide the judge and the parties with
150. A master with experience as a labor arbitrator stated that his arbitration skills
were his most useful resource in enabling him to carry out his duties as a master. See
Master F at 1.
Masters can also increase their effectiveness by meeting early in their tenure with other
masters. Several masters have followed this practice. See, e.g., Master A at 4. Masters
serving in other types of civil rights litigation should be included in these conferences.
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guidelines for supervising the master's actions and for challenging those
perceived to be unfair.
Judges can further reduce the possibility of unfairness by reviewing
the master's findings according to a substantial evidence standard.151
This scope of review would provide the parties with the opportunity
to challenge findings and would increase the judge's responsibility. At
the same time, the master could continue to perform a useful fact-
finding function.
Congress should encourage judges to clarify the master's role and to
provide greater accountability. One approach would be to revise Rule
53 to include a section on the use of masters in the disposition and
implementation of cases. The revised rule could educate judges con-
cerning the expanded use of masters by codifying the practice of using
masters in investigative, advisory, and administrative, as well as fact-
finding roles.
Conclusion
Until recently, courts have been forced to assume full responsibility
for the protection of inmates' civil rights. This Note has shown that the
use of masters may increase courts' effectiveness in carrying out moni-
toring functions, but cannot compensate fully for the limitations of the
judicial process. Effective intervention requires a range of strategies
with the goal of empowering the actors in the prison context to develop
constructive ways to resolve their own disputes.
151. Cf. K. DAvis, supra note 149, § 29.01 (use of substantial evidence standard in re-
view of administrative action).
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